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Abstract 
One of the central elements of the secularist tradition is atheism. Atheism has a long history 
and is nowadays again heavily debated. This article tries to present a reflection on the nature 
of atheism. The central thesis is that atheism is often misunderstood. The most fruitful 
definition of atheism is a negative one: an atheist does not believe in the god that theism 
favors. The concept of atheism should be carefully distinguished from the motives that some 
people have not to believe in the theistic god. The confusion of these two things is 
responsible for much needless controversy about atheism. 
Introduction 
[1] After 9/11 there seems to be not only a new interest in explicitly theistic conceptions of 
belief, but also for its traditional counterpoint: the atheist tradition. Books like those of 
Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Victor J. Stenger 
have reached a wide reading public. But the interest in atheism is certainly not confined to 
philosophers and intellectuals operating in the public debate. Also in scholarly circles 
atheism is again discussed and analysed (Antony; Martin). This article in meant to be a 
contribution to the literature on atheism focussing on what might be called a fruitful 
definition of atheism. 
[2] What is atheism? Sometimes atheism is presented as a coherent worldview, encompassing 
all the other traditions supposed to be associated with secularist orientations. So the 
Christian theologian and physicist Alister McGrath writes: “Atheism is the religion of the 
autonomous and rational human being, who believes that reason is able to uncover and 
express the deepest truths of the universe, from the mechanics of the rising sun to the nature 
and final destiny of humanity” (2004: 220). The first thing that strikes the reader is that 
atheism is here presented as a “religion.” A second point that is remarkable is that McGrath 
presents as “atheism” what most people will associate with “rationalism.” In clarifying his 
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definition the author even introduces other elements, such as optimism. Atheism, so 
McGrath writes, “was a powerful, self-confident, and aggressive worldview. Possessed of a 
boundless confidence, it proclaimed that the world could be fully understood and 
subsequently mastered” (2004: 220). Often these definitions seem animated by an aversion 
of the denial of God. This seems also the case with McGrath. McGrath wrote a history of 
atheism based on a claim of its declining significance. 
[3] A similar thesis is defended by the prolific Catholic historian Paul Johnson: “Atheism as a 
positive set of beliefs, including a code of moral behaviour, has failed to flourish” (2). It may 
be that fewer and fewer people in Western countries practice religion, Johnson tells us, but 
the number of those prepared to state their disbelief in God openly and specifically is 
extremely small. There is only a small minority who does that, probably not greater today 
than in the time of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), expelled from Oxford for atheism. But 
although Johnson is very clear in his rejection of atheism it is far from clear what he 
understands by the term, apart from the fact that it has something to do with a denial of 
God. 
[4] More attention is given to this matter in monographs explicitly dedicated to the subject of 
atheism. According to Julian Baggini, atheism is “extremely simple to define,” because “it is 
the belief that there is no God or gods” (3). In other definitions atheism is contrasted with 
theism. That is done by Robin Le Poidevin when he writes: “An atheist is one who denies the 
existence of a personal, transcendent creator of the universe rather than one who simply 
lives life without reference to such a being. A theist is one who asserts the existence of such a 
creator. Any discussion of atheism, then, is necessarily a discussion of theism” (xvii). So in 
contrast to Baggini, this writer specifies that atheism is related to a specific concept of god: the 
existence of a personal and transcendent creator of the universe. According to Le Poidevin 
atheism also implies a conscious and explicit position in the sense that simply living a life 
without God is not sufficient to call someone an “atheist.” We also find the same contrast 
between theism and atheism with Daniel Harbour who writes: “Atheism is the plausible and 
probably correct belief that God does not exist. Opposed to atheism, there is theism, the 
implausible and probably incorrect view that God does exist” (1). 
The Alpha Privans 
[5] Atheism is a-theism. So: “a,” hyphen, “theism.” An atheist is someone who does not 
subscribe to the central tenets of theism. The “a” is an alpha privans, it denies what follows. 
So an atheist denies what the theist tries to confirm. By denying what follows, you do not 
become identical with what follows (theism). Someone who is a-religious is simply what it 
says: not religious. It is not the case that by denying a religion you, by some magic trick, 
invent a religion of your own: the religion of irreligious or a-religious people. Perhaps this 
sounds like a commonplace, nevertheless it is necessary to state it. Often atheists are 
considered to be driven by a religious impulse: the religious impulse to deny religion. And 
denying religion is in itself a religion, it is said. Actually, we have seen that with McGrath. I 
consider this to be a strange rhetorical trick. 
[6] Because atheism is the denial of theism, every tract on atheism should also address the 
question “what is theism?” Theism is the same as – a more current term - monotheism. 
Theists are adherents to one of the three theistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
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Theists believe in one god. That makes the word “monotheism,” strictly speaking, a 
pleonasm. But theism is more than belief in one god, it requires also a conception of a specific 
god. God, according to theists, is good. And not only “good” in the sense you and I can be 
good, but perfectly good. If someone would identify, like the great Victorian poet Algernon 
Charles Swinburne (1837-1909) has done, God with evil (“the supreme evil, God”; Bury: 
208) this person cannot be a theist. The god of Jews, Christians, and Muslims is necessarily 
good. 
[7] Goodness is not the only tenet of the theistic god. He is eternal, the creator of the 
universe, almighty, transcendent, omniscient, holy, and personal. Western theology has tried 
to reflect on those characteristics and construe a concept of God that is consistent (McGrath 
1994; Tilghman: 10-46). 
Atheism and Liberal Concepts of God 
[8] Theism as outlined above is something different from religious belief in general. So 
atheism in the sense outlined here is not opposed to religion as such. Atheism is concerned 
with one specific concept of god: the theistic god. The theistic god has a name and this is written 
with a capital: God. At first sight it may be strange to limit atheism to the conception that is 
opposed to the theistic concept of god and not all the other gods that have been venerated 
by humans. Buddhists or Hindus subscribe to polytheistic approaches of the divine. Should 
they not be included in the atheist rejection of the divine, as Baggini did in the definition of 
atheism, mentioned before? I think not and I will now spell out my reasons for this narrow 
definition of atheism. 
[9] The best way to make my reasoning clear is by means of an example. Suppose there are 
people who are in awe or even venerate vague and wide dimensions of reality that they 
identify as “complete otherness” (“Das Ganz Andere”; Horkheimer), or that they refer to a 
certain mystical experience (Happold). It is also possible that people say, “God is love” or 
“the absolute” or “ultimate reality” or the “unsearchable region out of which all phenomena 
spring” (Caird: 8). Not only ordinary people do this sometimes, but theologians as well. Take 
the well-known theologian Paul Tillich (1886-1965). In his book Dynamics of Faith, Tillich tells 
us: “The fundamental symbol of our ultimate concern is God” (45). Here God is not a 
person, not a father, not a creator, but a symbol. You cannot pray to a symbol, so it seems. 
A symbol does not lead the Jewish people through the desert. A symbol does not reveal the 
Ten Commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai and symbols do not have sons to be sent to 
the earth to propitiate for our sins. The concept of God as advocated by Tillich is a 
completely different conception of God from the one that theistic religions proclaim. Should 
an atheist also be opposed to (or deny) the reality of such symbols? My answer is “no.” 
[10] Another theologian, John A. T. Robinson (1919-1983), criticizes in his book Honest to 
God the god-conception of a supernatural being “out there” or the “old man in the sky.” 
God, so Robinson proclaims, is, per definition, “ultimate reality.” And Robinson adds that it 
is meaningless to ask whether God exists. The only question we can fruitfully pose is: what 
does that ultimate reality look like? (29). 
[11] We find ideas like those of Robinson and Tillich also in the earlier work of the German 
theologians and philosophers of religion Rudolf Otto (1869-1937) and Friedrich Daniel 
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Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834). I will not be concerned with conceptions of the divine as 
advocated by these liberal theologians (see Lilla). Why not? 
[12] First, a possible discussion with Robinson and Tillich would probably not deal with 
theism or atheism but with logic, methodology, or philosophy of science. The discussion 
would focus on the question whether it is fruitful to discuss such vague concepts as 
“ultimate reality.” What is “reality”? Is the love for my child “reality” or “a reality”? Is the 
dream I had last night part of “reality”? These are all difficult problems that first have to be 
solved in order to discuss the matter whether God is “reality” (or “a reality”). And what 
characteristics should reality have to be “ultimate”? And what justification do we have to 
identify such vague concepts with “god”? Would not that be a kind of verbal inflation? Are 
not Tillich and Robinson presenting a kind of sophisticated atheism? 
[13] Suppose someone is completely involved in fishing in such a way that his “ultimate 
concern” lies in his hobby. During Sunday service this person sits at the border of the lake to 
enjoy his favorite sport. Would this make fishing his “religion”? Of course not. Following 
this semantic strategy would amount to an enormous verbal inflation. The eighteenth 
century freethinker and sexual debaucher Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) would have sadistic 
sex as his “religion.” Youngsters who idolize Justin Timberlake would be the members of a 
new “religious” sect. 
[14] Perhaps for sociologists of religion, trying to be as neutral as they can towards the 
different manifestations of “god,” “religion,” and the “divine,” this may be an interesting 
approach. But should it therefore be our leading perspective in every other context? This can 
be doubted and this doubt is highly relevant for atheism. An atheist, so it may be safely 
contended, is primarily concerned with one specific religious tradition. He is concerned with 
the idea of a personal, almighty, omniscient, and perfectly benevolent god. 
[15] Arguably, this is partly the product of the Greek rationalist tradition. It is what Pascal 
called the god of the philosophers. Atheism has no bearing on completely different 
conceptions of god, like the “God Without Being” (Jean-Luc Marion). By defining atheism 
in this limited way we acknowledge that it is difficult, if not impossible, and also useless to 
develop an argument against all the different concepts of god and religion that are sometimes 
defended. The only thing an atheist can do is to oppose the kind of language that makes it 
impossible to discern under what circumstances one can legitimately say, “I am not 
religious.” If everybody is “religious” but only the content of that religion varies, the word 
“religion” has lost all meaning. 
[16] Philosopher Roger Scruton writes: “We have cults like football, sacrificial offerings like 
Princess Diana and improvised saints like Linda McCartney” (232). He also speaks about 
“the new secular religion of human rights,” and continues: “I call it a religion because it 
seems to occupy the place vacated by faith. It tells us that we are the centre of the universe, 
that we are under no call to obedience, but that the world is ordered in accordance to our 
rights” (238). Such language can draw our attention to certain similarities between football 
and religion in the sense of one of the world’s religions, but we should be cautious in not 
identifying those phenomena. 
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[17] Let me present a last example by means of a dialogue to make that clear. Suppose 
someone would say “God is love” and the subsequent dialogue evolves: 
“Do you mean love is one aspect of the divine being?” 
“No, I mean God is love; God is identical with love.” 
“But in that case God can not be a person.” 
“No, indeed.” 
When an atheist opposes the statement “God is love” this is not because he wants to deny 
the importance of love, but because he deems it inappropriate to mix up this human 
emotion with the divine being that traditionally Judaism, Christianity, and Islam refer to as 
the transcendent, personal, almighty and perfectly good God. So there are good reasons why 
I stick to the limited conception of “atheism.” “Atheism” is nothing more than the denial of 
the claims of theism. 
Agression Against Atheism 
[18] Atheism has always been a very unpopular position, to say the least. Richard Bentley 
(1662-1742) wrote in 1724 in Eight Sermons that an atheist could never be a loyal friend 
(Edwards 1967: 174-89; 1998a; 1998b; Nagel). He also proclaimed that an affective relation 
is impossible with an atheist and that an atheist can never be a loyal citizen. The protestant 
theologian Robert Flint (1838-1910) wrote over a century ago that in every country where 
atheism will become dominant “national decay and disaster” would be the result. In France, 
it was impossible to publish books defending atheism until the French revolution, so famous 
atheist philosophers, like Baron d’Holbach (1723-1789) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784), 
wrote anonymously (Holbach 1997, 2006; Graille). 
[19] In classical antiquity the attitude towards atheists was more tolerant but also in Greek 
society there was no complete freedom of religion (including the possibility to reject a 
religion). Plato (c. 428-347 BCE) discerned four sorts of atheists, but they had all to be 
punished by death (Plato, The Laws, Book X; Schofield: 313). 
[20] The attitude towards atheism in the Middle Ages was, as one can expect, even more 
severe. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) proposes the death penalty for atheists (Summa 
Theologica, 2-2. I-16). Even John Locke (1632-1704), the writer of several treatises defending 
tolerance, was vehemently opposed to atheists. As a reason he presents that promises by 
atheists would not be implemented. When Holbach’s Le système de la nature (1770) was 
published the hangman complained that only the book could be burned and not the author. 
[21] Obviously, atheists in the past had to be cautious. And Joseph McCabe rightly censors a 
certain A. B. Drachmann, author of Atheism in Pagan Antiquity (1922), for not sufficiently 
having taken this into account. According to Drachmann only ten known Greek and Roman 
thinkers, and few others, were atheists over a period of more than thousand years. McCabe 
calls such a remark misleading: “Professor Drachmann means that very few stood out in the 
cities of Greece and said that the gods did not exist. Since everybody knows at least since the 
death of Socrates, partly on charge of atheism, it seems a waste of time to look for atheists in 
this sense” (McCabe: 31). 
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[22] What McCabe writes about the Greek philosophers in particular could be said about 
other philosophers as well. A case in point is that of Spinoza (1632-1677), considered to be 
one of the most important influences on the European Enlightenment (Israel 2001, 2006; 
Meinsma). Because of his unorthodox views he was excommunicated from the Jewish 
community in 1656 and he changed his name to Benedict. In 1670 his Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus was published – anonymously. His Ethica (1677) was only published after his death. 
The Ethica rejected the idea of a personal creator, free will, and personal immortality. That 
implies that measured against the criteria outlined before, Spinoza should be characterized as 
an “atheist.” 
[23] Like Kant and Hume (Mossner 1933, 1970; Graham), Spinoza was extremely cautious 
not to offend the authorities. He was well aware that freedom of speech was far from 
accepted in even a relatively free country as the Netherlands. The most vehement reactions 
to Spinozistic doctrines, however, were aimed at disciples of Spinoza such as Adriaan 
Koerbagh. 
[24] Adriaan Koerbagh (1632-1669) is considered to be one of the most radical thinkers of 
the early Enlightenment (Wielema). During the early 1660’s Adriaan and his brother 
Johannes Koerbagh (1634-1672) became involved with the heterodox Spinozistic circles in 
Amsterdam, and eventually with Spinoza himself. In 1668 Adriaan published two books, 
Bloemhof and Ligt, that struck at the very roots of Christianity. But Adriaan did what Spinoza 
himself was always too cautious to do: he published in the vernacular language. The reason 
was that he wanted to enlighten not only the academic elite, but the common people as well. 
He was sentenced in 1668 to ten years of imprisonment in the Rasphuis (a prison) and 
subsequent banishment from Holland. He died in prison because of the harsh conditions. 
[25] Although severe convictions as the one that struck Koerbagh are not heard of anymore 
in the western world, that should not make us forget that atheism or even the change of 
one’s religion to another religion is not possible in many quarters without fear of death or 
serious reprisals.1 When the stake as the ultima ratio theologorum could still be invoked, it 
certainly would be done, Schopenhauer remarks cynically at the end of the nineteenth 
century (Schopenhauer: 212). 
[26] It is difficult to understand how atheism can ignite so much hatred in other people. 
Recent rebuttals of atheism usually try to load atheism with colossal pretensions. This is for 
instance the case with a recent wave of criticism directed against the so-called “new atheism” 
of Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens. One of those 
criticisms contains the following sentence: 
Those who believe they know how to bring about a conclusion to life seek to 
eradicate all other schemes for human perfection. These competing visions, 
in their eyes, pollute society, lead people astray, and stymie the ultimate 
                                                
1 Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) explicitly states: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance” (italics added). 
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possibilities of human happiness. The new atheists, like all true believers, 
want these competing visions destroyed (Hedges: 99). 
Destroyed? These are very strange ideas about atheism. The average atheist, like Spinoza or 
Hume, is far distanced from the fanatic frame of mind that this author associates with a 
denial of the theistic conception of God. Nevertheless, atheists are not only feared but also 
hated, so it seems. 
[27] Atheism – or rather charges of atheism – can still pose great problems for the writers 
involved. The most serious attack on the principle of freedom of thought and religion was 
perpetrated by the Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989). If Khomeini had had his 
way, the British writer Salman Rushdie would have been killed for writing a novel (Pipes). 
The same applies for the Bengali novelist Taslima Nasreen who had to fly from India for 
criticising religion and openly advocating atheism.2 Also in the Middle East, several people 
have been killed by religious fanatics, such as the Egyptian thinker Farag Foda (Jansen). So 
although atheism is not legally prohibited in many parts of the world and even protected by 
the clauses on freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
worship in declarations of human rights and national constitutions, the situation is far from 
effectively securing freedom of conscience and the right to free discussion (for the relation 
between these concepts, see Macklem). What these examples make clear is that those 
favoring free speech, freedom of conscience, and the good right to critique (also criticism of 
religious ideas) have much more to refer to nowadays than the well known historical 
examples of religious violence against Giordano Bruno (1548-1600; Kirchhoff; Rowland), 
burned at the stake in 1600 or Galileo Galilei (1564-1642; Shea), intimidated by the Church 
and placed under house-arrest in 1633. 
[28] It is rather odd that even in the twenty-first century atheism is highly unpopular. It 
seems that the nature of the rejection of atheism has changed, but there still is, so it seems, a 
universal condemnation. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the atheist was being 
criticized because his worldview would undermine sound morals and deprive life of 
meaning. The contemporary complaints are that atheists show no “respect” for the religion 
of others or do not want to enter into “dialogue” with believers. Other complaints that are 
widely voiced are that atheists are “polarizing” society or “just as dogmatic” as religious 
fundamentalists. 
[29] These complaints are hardly convincing. Philosopher A. C. Grayling is right when he 
writes: “Religious apologists charge the non-religious with being ‘fundamentalist’ if they 
attack religion too robustly . . .” (Grayling: 7). He continues with the contention that “it is 
time to reverse the prevailing notion that religious commitment is intrinsically deserving of 
respect, and that it should be handled with kid gloves and protected by custom and in some 
cases law against criticism and ridicule” (15). His point of view with regard to religious 
criticism is that “nothing that people choose in the way of politics, lifestyle or religion should 
be immune from criticism and (when, as so often it does, it merits it) ridicule” (19). But this 
attitude is far from common nowadays. 
                                                
2 See De Standaard Online. For Nasreen’s “fellow atheist” Ayaan Hirsi Ali, life in the Netherlands had become 
more or less impossible (see her own discussion in Hirsi Ali). 
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[30] Against the background of the universal unpopularity of atheism it is hardly surprising 
that the epithet is usually rejected and seldom vindicated. Only few philosophers insisted on 
being called an “atheist” (Edwards 1967: 175). Most people are being labelled “atheist” by 
their opponents, like Hume, and sometimes with unfortunate consequences for those 
involved. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762) confided that the philosophy of Hume 
could be characterized as follows: “Take the ‘not’ out of the Decalogue and put it in the 
Creed” (quoted in Beck: 41). 
Three Characteristics of Atheism 
Atheism as Non-Theism 
[31] So far I have indicated what atheism is not. This “negative” approach is defended by the 
philosopher Ernest Nagel (1901-1985). Nagel puts it as follows: “I shall understand by 
‘atheism’ a critique and a denial of the major claims of all varieties of theism.” And theism is 
the view which holds that the “heavens and the earth and all that they contain owe their 
existence and continuance in existence to the wisdom and will of a supreme, self-consistent, 
omnipotent, omniscient, righteous, and benevolent being, who is distinct from, and 
independent of, what he has created” (461, building on Robert Flint’s definition of theism). 
In this quote we encounter the elements of theism as introduced above. 
[32] “Negative atheism” was also the focus of the most important advocate of atheism in the 
nineteenth century: Charles Bradlaugh (1833-1891). Apart from being an atheist, Bradlaugh 
was a campaigner for progressive causes such as birth control, republicanism, the alleviation 
of poverty, and the separation of Church and State. He defined the essence of atheism thus: 
The atheist does not say “There is no God,” but he says: “I know not what 
you mean by God; I am without idea of God; the word “God” is to me a 
sound conveying no clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because 
I cannot deny that of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable 
to define it to me (10). 
According to the New Zealand philosopher and freethinker Bill Cooke, the philosophy of 
atheism was helped tremendously by the distinction between negative and positive atheism. 
“This had done a lot to clear up very old misconceptions about what atheism is really 
saying” (49). 
Who has to Prove What? 
[33] This “negative approach” to atheism (defining atheism in terms of what it is not) has 
serious consequences for the burden of proof. Atheism in the sense outlined above simply 
denies the claims of theism. “Theists believe in God, while atheists do not have such a 
belief,” as it is succinctly formulated by B. C. Johnson (11). Atheists do not have the 
pretension to be able to prove that God does not exist. The atheist George H. Smith puts it 
as follows: “Atheism, in its basic form, is not a belief: it is the absence of belief” (7). That 
implies that the atheist does not defend the claim that he can prove God’s non-existence, 
neither does he need to. According to Smith, “An atheist is not primarily a person who 
believes that a god does not exist; rather, he does not believe in the existence of a god” (7). 
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[34] I elaborately quote the pretensions of a self-confessed atheist because his words 
contradict what often is alleged about atheists. Atheism is commonly presented as a special 
kind of belief that God does not exist. We find this in the definition by the well-known 
philosopher of religion John Hick, who writes: “atheism (not-God-ism) is the belief that 
there is no God of any kind” (5). By attributing to atheism the pretension that it must reject 
the gods of any kind, Hick enhances the claims that a more cautious atheist will be inclined to 
embrace (Baggini, whose definition of atheism is quoted above, is an exception). But he also 
deviates from the approach of Nagel and Bradlaugh in the sense that according to Hick the 
atheist must prove that God does not exist. This puts the atheist in a very disadvantageous 
position, because if the atheist is not successful in this undertaking (and how can he ever be 
successful with such an ambitious goal?), it is commonly surmised he has failed to 
substantiate his position. But according to Smith and others, this is an impossible claim to 
make. The only thing the atheist has to do is to wait until the theist has made his position 
clear. When that is the case, the atheist can judge whether he is convinced by his arguments. 
If not, then atheism is the stronger position over theism. 
[35] Is not that the way we normally operate? I cannot prove that the world is not created by 
an elephant standing on the back of a tortoise, but why should I? It is the speaker who 
makes such a claim who has to prove his case. 
[36] The atheist’s position may be summarized as follows: atheism is a negative doctrine. The 
atheist is not convinced by the proofs of theism. And this not being the case, he does what 
every sensible person would do. That is, he says, “I am not a theist.” This is far from what 
Alister McGrath expects atheists to defend. McGrath gleefully makes the pretenses of the 
atheist colossal: “Atheism is the religion of the autonomous and rational human being, who 
believes that reason is able to uncover and express the deepest truths of the universe, from 
the mechanics of the rising sun to the nature and final destiny of humanity” (2004: 220). So 
an atheist should have the pretension to solve the riddle of the universe. He should be able 
to express “the deepest truths of the universe.” That kind of vocabulary does not make 
sense to atheists. What special properties must a truth possess to be “deep” or even 
“deepest”? Why should the atheist commit himself to speculations about the “final destiny 
of the universe”? McGrath mistakes atheism for a religion, in his case the religion of 
Christianity. Christianity has the pretension to provide deep truths about the universe, for 
example, that Jesus is the Son of God (see Evans). Christianity also pretends to know what is 
the final destiny of the universe: a resurrection of the dead, an apocalypse or the return of 
Christ on earth, or other parts of the Christian eschatology (see Kirsch). Because McGrath 
thinks that atheism is the exact antithesis of Christian belief, he supposes that the atheist 
must also have certain opinions on these matters, but this is not the case. In reality we never 
hear atheists boasting about the discovery of deep truths and ideas about the final destiny of 
the universe. Probably McGrath confuses atheism with the worldview of Marxism-Leninism 
of which a denial of God was one part (see Froese: 35-40). But no sane atheist would have 
such pretence. The British philosopher Anthony Flew once made this clear with the 
expression, the presumption of atheism (1976; for a new development in his thinking, see 2007). 
In other words, we should take atheism as the default position. The theist has to prove his 
case. The historian J. B. Bury (1861-1927) presents this idea with a funny example: 
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If you were told that in a certain planet revolving round Sirius there is a race 
of donkeys who talk the English language and spend their time in discussing 
eugenics, you could not disprove the statement, but would it, on that 
account, have any claim to be believed? (20). 
Atheism is an Examined Choice 
[37] A third element of the atheist position is the psychological attitude of the atheist 
himself: atheism is considered to be an intellectual and explicit choice. I hinted on this 
matter above in discussing the thesis by Le Poidevin: simply living a life without God is not 
sufficient to call someone an “atheist.” Let me illustrate this with an example. Suppose 
someone tells us: “God? I do not know what that means. I have never thought about the 
matter.” How should we characterize this view? Is the person expressing this view an 
“atheist”? Many of us will waver and rightly so. What this person lacks is a conscious 
intellectual commitment; it would be strange to characterize this person as an “atheist.” That 
is why children by definition cannot be “atheists,” as Holbach once proclaimed they were. 
People who have never thought about God are pagans perhaps, not atheists. 
[38] We may introduce the category of “implicit atheism,” of course, but this should be 
distinguished from atheism as a conscious stance. Essential for the atheist position is 
weighing all the options, that is, all the traditional arguments for the existence of God. Who 
after careful consideration is not committed may be characterized as an atheist. 
The Concept of Atheism and Motives for Atheism 
[39] What I have outlined in the sections above is, basically, what the concept of atheism 
entails. We should not mix this up with motives for atheism. Many people are motivated not 
to subscribe to the belief in an omnipotent, perfectly good, personal God because this would 
conflict with important values they favor. It is also perfectly possible to say that one can be a 
“non-believer” in the existence of God (and so an atheist) and a “believer” in human 
freedom, human dignity, progress, and many other things. As a matter of fact, this is a 
combination that one often encounters. People’s motives for developing an atheist position 
are often grounded in a laudable type of engagement and not in disillusion. So with most 
atheists we find a combination of “belief” and “unbelief,” but what they believe in is not 
God and sometimes deemed to be irreconcilable with God. That is manifested clearly in a 
kind of “profession of faith” by the great American infidel Robert Ingersoll (1833-1899). 
Ingersoll wrote: 
I am an unbeliever, and I am a believer . . . I do not believe in the “Mosaic” 
account of creation, or in the flood, or the Tower of Babel, or that General 
Joshua turned back the sun or stopped the earth. I do not believe in the 
Jonah story . . . and I have my doubts about the broiled quails furnished in 
the wilderness. Neither do I believe that man is wholly depraved. I have not 
the least faith in the Eden, stake and apple story. Neither do I believe that 
God is an eternal jailer; that he is going to be the warden of an everlasting 
penitentiary in which the most of men are to be eternally tormented. I do not 
believe that any man can be justly punished or rewarded on account of his 
belief. 
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But I do believe in the nobility of human nature; I believe in love and home, 
and kindness and humanity; I believe in good fellowship and cheerfulness, in 
making wife and children happy. I believe in good nature, in giving to others 
all the rights that you claim for yourself. I believe in free thought, in reason, 
observation and experience. I believe in self-reliance and in expressing your 
honest thoughts. I have hope for the whole human race. What will happen to 
one, will, I hope, happen to all, and that, I hope, will be good. Above all, I 
believe in Liberty (quoted in Williams: 67).3 
Ingersoll was a great success as a public speaker, as everyone will understand who reads this 
passage, and this probably has to do with the fact that he, as no other, understood how to 
ride the moral high ground (much as the Victorian scholar W. K. Clifford). He competed 
with the religious orators in the sense that he used some of their imagery, e.g. when he 
writes: “I believe in the religion of reason - the gospel of this world; in the development of 
the mind, in the accumulation of intellectual wealth, to the end that man may free himself 
from superstitious fear, to the end that he may take advantage of the forces of nature to feed 
and clothe the world” (1889: 6). 
[40] It is very difficult to cast somebody who writes and speaks like this as a cynic or as 
someone without firm beliefs and ideals. 
[41] As we may expect on the basis of the last sentence of the passage from Ingersoll, one of 
the most important values that animates much of atheist writing is the attempt to safeguard 
human freedom. This we encounter in the work of the German philosopher Eduard Von 
Hartmann (1842-1906). In 1874 Von Hartmann wrote a small book under the title Die 
Selbstzersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft (“The Self-annihilation of 
Christianity and the Philosophy of the Future”), in which he distinguishes between the 
traditional religious position based on moral heteronomy and his own position based on 
moral autonomy. It was in particular the protestant tradition in Christianity that brought 
human autonomy to the fore, but, so Von Hartmann argues, the principle of moral 
autonomy, although generated within the Christian worldview, will ultimately destroy 
Christianity. And he is happy with that. Once one gives primacy to human reason and moral 
autonomy, the authority of the divine will and scripture have to be rejected: “For the 
absolute moral principle of Christianity is obedience to the divine will as expressed in Holy 
Scripture” (“Das absolute Moralprinzip des Christenthums ist nämlich das des Gehorsams 
gegen den in der heiligen Schrift ausgesprochenen göttlichen Willen”; 12). This is – and here 
comes my point – irreconcilable with human freedom. As long as we believe in the theistic 
god who has created us and the rest of the world, we are nothing. Our true morality can be 
nothing different from strict submission to the almighty will of this transcendent God. In 
that situation morality is always heteronomous.4 
                                                
3 Ingersoll also stated: “Now and then some one asks me why I am endeavouring to interfere with the religious 
faith of others, and why I try to take from the world the consolation naturally arising from a belief in eternal 
fire. And I answer: I want to do what little I can to make my country truly free. I want to broaden the horizon 
of our people” (7). 
4 Von Hartmann also argues, “So lange ich . . . an einen theïstische Gott glaube, der mich samt der Welt 
geschaffen, und dem ich gegenüberstehe wie das Gefäß dem Töpfer, so lange bin ich ein Nichts gegen ihn, eine 
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[42] True morality, so Von Hartmann contends, will always start with human autonomy, and 
like Ingersoll, he also spells out what this implies for the theistic worldview: “then all theistic 
morality will be necessarily unethical” (“so muss alle theistische Moral nothwendig unsittlich 
wirken”; 30). That implies that the “Christian idea” has run its full course (“Die christliche 
Idee hat ihre Lebensbahn bis zu Ende durchlaufen”; 91). We have to find a new spiritual 
perspective for the modern world. As long as we believe in the idea of the theistic God we 
are nothing but an object, a material object made by a divine creator and accordingly limited 
in our freedom. 
[43] The same was contended by the twentieth century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1905-1980). If we try to imagine a world created by a divine creator, a supernatural 
handworks man, we, humans, are not free. We can only play the role that He has written for 
us and that completely destroys human freedom. So Sartre develops what he calls an 
“atheistic existentialism,” in contrast to Christian varieties of existentialism as had been 
developed by Christian philosophers like Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973). Human freedom 
demands that we proclaim that man has no “essence,” but only “existence.” Only within the 
confines of such an ontology is human freedom secured.5 
[44] So far we have seen that some thinkers consider the theistic worldview as contradicting 
human freedom. That has to do with the field of meta-ethics. But it is also possible to 
present a critique on the theistic worldview because the values it espouses conflict with our 
own values. This is the focus of one of the most elegant books on moral and political 
philosophy from an explicitly atheist point of view: An Atheist’s Values by Richard Robinson 
(1964). Robinson (1902-1996) studied philosophy at Oxford and Marburg, taught 
philosophy at Cornell University for nearly 20 years and then back at Oriel College for more 
than 20 years. He wrote on classical philosophy (in particular Plato and Aristotle) and logic 
(1931, 1962). 
[45] Robinson states that we hear people talk about “Christian values.” What he tries to do 
with An Atheist’s Values is offer a counterpoint. He makes a distinction between “personal 
goods” and “political goods.” As the personal goods he describes beauty, truth, reason, love, 
conscientiousness, and religion. His treatment of religion is, as one may expect, very critical. 
Religion is more of an evil than a good because it is gravely inimical to truth and reason 
(1964: 113). Faith is a vice. There is no God or afterlife and religion provides no good reason 
for behaving morally. But Robinson also gives an introduction to political philosophy with 
his treatment of the “political goods”: the state, equality, freedom, tolerance, peace and 
justice, and democracy. 
[46] An Atheist’s Values is in many ways a brilliant book, but I fear the title of the book is 
somewhat misleading. Many people will be scared off because they expect a long diatribe 
                                                                                                                                            
Scherbe in seiner Hand, und kann meine Sittlichkeit in nichts anderem bestehen, als in der strickten blinden 
Unterwerfung den allmächtigen heiligen Willen dieses transzendenten Gottes, d.h. so lange kann alle Moralität 
nur auf dem von außen an mich herantretenden Gebot beruhen, oder heteronom sein” (30). 
5 See 1943: 485 ff.; 1970: 17, where Sartre states that all forms of existentialism have in common that existence 
precedes essence, or, if you want, that one has to take subjectivity as a point of departure (“que l’existence 
précède l’essence, ou si vous voulez, qu’il faut partir de la subjectivité”). 
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against religious faith, Christianity in particular. This is not the case. What Robinson shows is 
that it is perfectly possible to write about ethics and politics from a purely secular 
perspective. In other words, a secular life stance is perfectly suited for moral and political 
reflection. 
[47] Another author that is in a certain sense similar to Robinson is L. Susan Stebbing (1885-
1943). Stebbing was the first female professor in philosophy in Britain and what Bill Cooke 
calls a “formidable smiter of humbug” (505). She came down strongly against pretentious 
woolly thought, as can be extracted from her Thinking to Some Purpose (1939) and also from 
her Philosophy and the Physicists (1937) where she targets Sir James Jeans (1877-1946) and Sir 
Arthur Eddington (1882-1944), two theistic astronomers who according to Stebbing strayed 
from their area of specialty into Christian apologetics. 
[48] Stebbing was writing in a time that British universities became a stronghold for 
analytical philosophy. The attitude of this philosophical current with regard to values was 
not very forthcoming. It was associated with the metaphysical and absolutist philosophy of 
Plato and it acolytes. So T. D. Weldon, well known for his analytical approach to political 
philosophy, writes somewhat dismissively about 
Plato and his modern disciples who suppose that philosophy leads to the 
discovery of eternal Ideas and Values and that anyone who is acquainted with 
these must know beyond any possibility of doubt how all States ought to be 
organised and what the relation of States to one another and to their own 
members ought to be. This special insight into the nature of reality makes the 
philosopher the final court of appeal of all kinds of important practical 
problems such as education, birth-control and the proper use of atomic 
bombs (1946: preface). 
It is a funny statement, of course, and before the eye of the mind arises the image of a 
pretentious philosopher-cleric who has no practical experience whatsoever and still tries to 
tell us how “beyond any possibility of doubt” we have to deal with the great political 
problems. And yet, we may ask ourselves whether a curious and modest philosopher who 
engages in analysing and weighing values and subsequently advocating some of these values 
necessarily has to be such a pompous figure. Anyhow, this is not the impression we get from 
the work of such intellectually integer philosophers as John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, 
Richard Robinson, and Suzan Stebbing, or a contemporary moral philosopher such as Peter 
Singer (see 1993; 2004, which combine critical acumen with a firm choice of values). It 
seems possible to engage in an analysis of values and still avoid the pretentious claims of the 
Hegelians that Weldon and his fellow analytical philosophers revolt against. 
[49] Stebbing formulated another vision on this topic than Weldon. In 1943, she wrote: 
“Moral philosophers, I contend, must be concerned with the ways in which men live – their 
ways of life which embody their ideals. I conceive that it falls within the proper province of 
moral philosophers to formulate ideals worth living for and the attempt to make clear 
principles which may afford guides for action. This is a task difficult to fulfill” (Stebbing 
1952a: 4). 
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[50] In Ideals and Illusions, Stebbing listed “spiritual excellences” that were not based on any 
religious conviction: 
• Love for other human beings; 
• Delight in creative activities of all kinds; 
• Respect for truth and the satisfaction in learning to know what is true about the 
world and about ourselves; 
• Loyalty to other human beings; 
• Generosity of thought and sympathy with those who suffer, and hatred of cruelty 
and other evils; 
• Delight in the beauty of nature and in art; and 
• To have experience of pain and of forgoing what would be good for oneself in order 
that the needs of others may be met (1948: 29-30). 
Like Robinson, she did not shy away from presenting values and even wanted to use the 
word “spiritual” for her “goods” or “values.” 
[51] The last philosopher we have to mention in this context is the most well known: 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970). Russell had a tremendous influence in the whole tradition of 
twentieth century secularist thought. He was, in a phrase borrowed from Noel Annan, 
“writing in a prose whose lucidity was equalled by its elegance” (101). With books as The 
Scientific Outlook, Religion and Science, Why I am Not a Christian and Other Essays, and many others 
he proved to be a paragon of liberal and secular thought in the twentieth century, 
comparable only with his godfather, John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. Russell wrote 
also an influential history of philosophy in which his worldview is expressed in sometimes-
hilarious comments on his colleague philosophers, ancient and modern (1974). One of his 
pieces that is less well known but highly relevant for our topic is his “Liberal Decalogue” as 
part of what he called the “Liberal outlook.” “Perhaps the essence of the Liberal outlook 
could be summed up in a new Decalogue, not intended to replace the old one but only to 
supplement it,” Russell writes (1951). This is what Russell as a twenty-first century liberal-
secular legislator presents us: 
1. Do not feel absolutely certain of anything. 
2. Do not think it worth while to proceed by concealing evidence, for the evidence is 
sure to come to light. 
3. Never try to discourage thinking for you are sure to succeed. 
4. When you meet opposition, even if it should be from your husband or your children, 
endeavour to overcome it by argument and not by authority, for a victory dependent 
upon authority is unreal and illusory. 
5. Have no respect for the authority of others, for there are always contrary authorities 
to be found. 
The Definition of Atheism 
 
Journal of Religion & Society 15 11 (2009) 
6. Do not use power to suppress opinions you think pernicious, for if you do the 
opinions will suppress you. 
7. Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion, for every opinion now accepted was once 
eccentric. 
8. Find more pleasure in intelligent dissent than in passive agreement, for, if you value 
intelligence as you should, the former implies deeper agreement than the latter. 
9. Be scrupulously truthful, even if the truth is inconvenient, for it is more inconvenient 
when you try to conceal it. 
10. Do not feel envious of the happiness of those who live in a fool’s paradise, for only a 
fool will think that is happiness. 
These examples of Stebbing, Robinson, and Russell could be augmented ad libitum, but that 
is not necessary within the confines of this article. My primary purpose is analytical, more in 
particular to distinguish the concept of atheism (limited or “negative”) from the motives that 
atheists have for subscribing to this position (a predilection of human freedom, as we see in 
the work of Sartre and Von Hartmann or specific liberal values as expounded by Stebbing, 
Robinson, and Russell). 
[52] Only if we carefully distinguish between the limited (or negative) conception of atheism 
and the motives for atheism is a fruitful debate about atheism possible. If we – as authors 
like McGrath do – use “atheism” as an umbrella formula for a variety of ideals as 
rationalism, belief in progress, belief in the secularization thesis, and many other elements 
associated with secularist approaches, the discussion between theists and atheists will remain 
needlessly rhetorical and fruitless. If we stick to the negative conception of atheism, on the 
other hand, it is a fruitful term that can be used to designate the differences between those 
who believe in the existence of a god with the characteristics that theists ascribe to God. 
Atheism or Non-Theism? 
[53] Atheism in the sense coined above seems also a defensible position. The only problem is that 
hardly anybody follows the semantic convention that I have proposed. In popular parlance, 
atheism is associated with all kinds of negative ideas and attitudes, especially with the way it 
can be defended. Atheists have a reputation for being arrogant, militant, missionary, zealous, 
and also impolite if not rude. For that very reason George Jacob Holyoake coined the word 
“secularism.” 
[54] George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906) is nowadays most famous for his trial on the 
ground of “blasphemy” (Levy: 453; Bradlaugh Bonner: 71-75). At one of his lectures in 
Cheltenham, he was confronted with a question from the audience about man’s duty to 
God. Holyoake’s response was that England was too poor to have a God. So it would not be 
a bad idea to put Him on “half pay.” For this remark he was arrested and sentenced to six 
months in jail. After his release he returned to Cheltenham where he reiterated the exact 
words that had gotten him into trouble the first time. 
[55] Less well known is that Holyoake coined the word “secularism.” He did this because he 
was convinced that “atheism” was in bad repute. Secularism was defined by him as concern 
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with the problems of this world. He summarized his position as follows: “1. Secularism 
maintains the sufficiency of Secular reason for guidance in human duties. 2. The adequacy of 
the Utilitarian rule which makes the good of others, the law of duty. 3. That the duty nearest 
at hand and most reliable in results is the use of material means, tempered by human 
sympathy for the attainment of social improvement. 4. The sinlessness of well-informed 
sincerity. 5. That the sign and condition of such sincerity are – Freethought – expository 
speech – the practice of personal conviction within the limits of neither outraging nor 
harming others” (348). 
[56] Holyoake may have been a learned man but he did not have the gift of making snappy 
formulations. Nevertheless, in one thing he was right: the concept of “atheism” is hopelessly 
tainted with negative images and every author that would try to launch this epithet as the 
banner of his lifestyle is confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties. He is constantly 
obliged to explain his use of the term “atheism” while his audience reacts with: “All right, 
but is not atheism also . . .”? And then a whole litany against atheism is begun: Is it not a bit 
arrogant to pretend to know that God does not exist? (Answer: the atheist does not proclaim 
that God does not exist, he affirms that the reasons to believe in his existence are not 
convincing). Why are people not allowed to believe in God? (Answer: atheists are not against 
free speech or against freedom of conscience; they only claim the right to disagree with 
someone who affirms the existence of God). Is not atheism a bit arrogant? (Answer: atheism 
is no more arrogant than agnosticism or theism. The “arrogance” is not in the position itself, 
but in the way that people hold their opinions – dogmatic, not willing to discuss their views. 
Atheists are usually fond of discussions). 
[57] So although atheism is a defensible position to take, the odds are very much against it. 
That brought many proponents to the conclusion that it may be better to keep the position 
but to change the name. We find this with A. C. Grayling, for instance. He avoids the term 
“atheism” when he writes: “I subscribe to a non-religious outlook, and criticise religions 
both as belief systems and as institutional phenomena which, as the dismal record of history 
and the present both testify, have done and continue to do much harm to the world, 
whatever good can be claimed for them besides” (9). So Grayling speaks of a “non-religious 
outlook.” He also writes: “As it happens, no atheist should call himself or herself one. The 
term already sells a pass to theists, because it invites debate on their ground. A more 
appropriate term is ‘naturalist’, denoting one who takes it that the universe is a natural realm, 
governed by nature’s laws” (28; see also Kors: 7, who writes that Calvin, Luther, Zwingli, 
and also Erasmus were all decried as “atheists” in the debates on their work). 
[58] Another point that makes atheism unpopular is that it seems to be connected to one of 
the most oppressive systems in human history, Marxism-Leninism, as the official philosophy 
of the state in the Soviet-Union and its satellite states between roughly 1917 till 1989. 
[59] Again, we should clearly proclaim that atheism in the sense of the simple denial of the 
theistic position does not imply some sort of state doctrine. Atheism in the sense indicated is 
“private” atheism. So that brings us to three kinds of atheism or rather three positions an 
atheist can take towards his own view of life. First, there is “private atheism” or what could 
also be called “non-theism”: the view of someone who rejects the theistic worldview and 
proclaims to do this on good grounds. Second, there is “public atheism.” Here the atheist 
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creed is perceived to be something that we have to share with fellow citizens, because 
otherwise no decent society is possible. So here some “missionary” element is involved: the 
atheist actively wants to “convert” his fellow citizens to his personal conviction. Third, there 
is “political atheism,” being the conviction that the state has to eradicate all kinds of religious 
belief, as was done in the Soviet Union and in Albania. 
[60] Atheism as a defensible position should be primarily private atheism or non-theism, 
sceptical towards public atheism, and downright dismissive of political atheism. But because 
“atheism” in the first sense has overtones of atheism in the second and third sense it may be 
a feasible strategy to refrain from using the term altogether and rather refer to “non-theism.” 
If we would do that, we may acknowledge that atheists have won the intellectual battle, but 
lost the debate on public relations. 
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